Paul Dolan’s Beliefism tackles a form of polarisation: hostility towards opposing views (rather than the ideological divides themselves) which he terms “beliefism”. Coming from a behavioural science perspective, Dolan offers empathy-driven strategies to reduce animosity. Though his optimism downplays the challenge of structural forces like social media and inequality, this book is a thought-provoking guide to fostering tolerance in polarised societies, writes Nauman Asghar.
The age of polarisation
In the past decade the phenomenon of polarisation – the tendency for differences in opinions to become more extreme – has affected societies regardless of their level of economic, political or technological development. It has resulted in dysfunctional governments, fractured societies, and citizens’ weakened trust in the state. Amid these dangerous implications, scholars and policymakers have proposed ways to mitigate polarisation by bridging divides and building a consensus on contentious policy questions, including immigration reforms and climate-change policies, that sharply divide the public.
His project is not about reducing polarisation in views. Instead, Dolan addresses a specific form of polarisation that is characterised by hostility or negative emotions induced by differences in views – what he terms ‘beliefism’.
In Beliefism: How to Stop Hating People You Disagree With, behavioural scientist Paul Dolan sets himself apart from such efforts, emphasising that his project is not about reducing polarisation in views. Instead, Dolan addresses a specific form of polarisation that is characterised by hostility or negative emotions induced by differences in views – what he terms “beliefism”. But Dolan argues that people can suffer extreme positions without mutual disdain. He invites readers to shift their perspective from what people believe to how they feel about those who hold different beliefs. This focus on affect, rather than substantive disagreement, distinguishes Dolan’s contribution from more conventional approaches to polarisation.
Mitigating feelings of hostility, not the views themselves
Dolan’s contention that we can reduce feelings of hostility without changing the extremity of beliefs has an underlying assumption: extremity of views does not constitute a necessary condition for affective polarisation. This perspective considers that ideological polarisation (policy disagreement) and affective polarisation (emotional hostility) are separate phenomena and are not interlinked. This assumption is important because agreeing or disagreeing with it would point to divergent interventions to mitigate affective polarisation. Dolan adopts the view that affective polarisation is primarily driven by group identity ratherthan substantive policy differences.
However, this assumption is non-trivial and not uncontroversial. Evidence indicates that ideological polarisation significantly contributes to affective polarisation. Experimental research suggests that the description of political candidates as moderate or extreme influences voters’ emotions towards candidates. In addition, recent work has found that people care more about substantive policy positions than partisan loyalty when the two come into conflict. With the rise of extreme positions, policy differences become more pronounced and moralised. Individuals perceive higher stakes and formulate affective evaluations, which transform disagreements into moral boundaries of right and wrong.
Ways to cross-belief interaction and empathy
Dolan’s assumption about the origins of affective polarisation informs his framework for reducing emotional hostility. He proposes increasing tolerance towards opposing viewpoints through micro-level interventions, instead of taking steps to influence the media environment and elite polarisation that could directly affect policy differences. He encourages individuals to consider situational factors when evaluating others, to learn from their mistakes, to highlight commonalities, to support their positions with compelling evidence, to manage their emotional responses to disagreement, to ensure the diversity of experience in decision-making, and to spend time with people who hold opposing beliefs. These strategies – underpinned with evidence from behavioural studies about their efficacy – aim to increase cross-belief interaction and empathy. However, Dolan does not consider environmental barriers, such as algorithmic bubbles created by personalized content feeds and highly polarized elite rhetoric, which may make it difficult for individuals to apply these behavioural changes.
Democratic institutions and polarisation
While highlighting the role of situational factors in relation to policy issues, Dolan argues that the legitimacy of the policymaking process can help reduce beliefism. As he puts it, “If the processes in the environment are legitimate, then we expect to see less beliefism. […] In liberal democracies, most people appreciate that competing beliefs are put to the test at the ballot box.” (80) Importantly, Dolan’s point is not about how democratic institutions may help narrow policy differences, but about their capacity to make opposing positions more acceptable. This reflects an optimistic view of the relationship between democratic practices and affective polarisation. The Brexit referendum in the UK was a democratic exercise, yet the vote deepened social and territorial fractures.
Dolan’s reliance on reason and evidence as remedies for beliefism also warrants scrutiny. He suggests that encouraging rational engagement with facts can soften hostility. Yet research in cognitive psychology and political communication consistently demonstrates that people rarely change their minds in response to new information. When individuals are invested in their beliefs due to their extremity, they engage in motivated reasoning, accepting information that aligns with their group and discounting or distrusting information that does not.
The limits of empathy in persuading certain groups
In environments of extreme positions, evidence from the “other side” is not merely rejected; it is viewed with suspicion. For example, the policy differences on mandating COVID-19 vaccine led to personal insults against scientists in attempts to discredit the scientific evidence. Thus, Dolan’s emphasis on rational discourse underestimates the power of cognition driven by policy positions. And the widening of policy differences due to extreme positions is likely to enhance the use of motivated reasoning in interpreting information and evaluating evidence.
For individuals or groups whose identities are marginalised or historically devalued, engaging with opposing beliefs can entail significant psychological and social costs, especially when the other side’s viewpoint may deny their basic rights or humanity.
Moreover, Dolan’s appeal to empathy and perspective-taking, while commendable, contains an implicit asymmetry. The act of borrowing the other side’s perspective assumes that all parties enter dialogue on a relatively equal footing. Yet for individuals or groups whose identities are marginalised or historically devalued, engaging with opposing beliefs can entail significant psychological and social costs, especially when the other side’s viewpoint may deny their basic rights or humanity. Asking such individuals to empathise with hostile perspectives carries the risk of reinforcing inequities under the guise of civility. In such cases, appeals to tolerance are not neutral and instead place a disproportionate burden on those already compelled to defend their dignity or existence. This tension brings to view the limits of behavioural prescriptions: empathy and engagement, though valuable, cannot substitute for justice or equality in social relations.
The optimism underlying Dolan’s approach underestimates the extent to which affective responses may be rooted in ideological disagreements that have widened by social media algorithms, income inequality, and elite polarisation. Social media platforms, driven by the motive of increasing user engagement, promote extremist content. Further, research suggests that rising income inequality contributes to the uptake of extreme positions by political parties. While acknowledging the role of the “digital realm” in triggering emotional responses, Dolan urges individuals to manage emotional responses while leaving the online environment intact. However, without addressing the media environment that fuels polarisation and narrowing socio-economic disparities, efforts to cultivate civility would risk treating the symptoms rather than the sources of animosity. To achieve the goal of reducing beliefism, we must pair behavioural insights with institutional reforms that influence incentives for media platforms in promoting partisanship, and that help to reduce economic inequality.
Note: This review gives the views of the author and not the position of the LSE Review of Books blog, nor of the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Main image: Lightspring on Shutterstock.
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